Capital Sentencing, Death Penalty, Penry v. Johnson, Mitigation, Mitigating Evidence
Question:
In Smith v.
Texas, 543 U.S. 37 (2004), this Court summarily reversed the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and found constitutional error under Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S.302 (1989) (Penry I), and Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (Penry II). Is it consistent with this Court's remand in this case for the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals to deem the error in petitioner's case harmless based on its view
that jurors were in fact able to give adequate consideration and effect to petitioner's
mitigating evidence notwithstanding this Court's conclusion to the contrary?
Can the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, based on a procedural determination that
it declined to adopt in its original decision that this Court then summarily reversed,
impose on remand a daunting standard of harm ("egregious harm") to the
constitutional violation found by this Court?