SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
MICHAEL C. ANTONELLI
98-9933 v.
DALE CARIDINE ET AL.
MICHAEL C. ANTONELLI
99-5445 v.
UNITED STATES
ON MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Nos. 98-9933 and 99-5445. Decided October 12, 1999
PER CURIAM.
Pro se petitioner Antonelli seeks leave to proceed in
forma pauperis under Rule 39 of this Court. We deny
these requests as frivolous pursuant to Rule 39.8. Anton-
elli is allowed until November 2, 1999, within which to pay
the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit his
petitions in compliance with this Court's Rule 33.1. We
also direct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for
certiorari or petitions for extraordinary writs from Anton-
elli in noncriminal matters unless he first pays the dock-
eting fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petitions in
compliance with Rule 33.1.
Antonelli has abused this Court's certiorari and ex-
traordinary writ processes. On June 21, 1993, and No-
vember 29, 1993, we invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Antonelli
in forma pauperis status with respect to two petitions for
certiorari. See Antonelli v. Illinois, 509 U. S. 902, Anton-
elli v. O'Malley, 510 U. S. 988. Prior to the two Rule 39.8
denials, Antonelli had filed 34 petitions for certiorari and
2 petitions for extraordinary writs, all of which were both
frivolous and had been denied without recorded dissent.
Since the 2 Rule 39.8 denials, Antonelli has filed 17 peti-
tions for certiorari, all of which were also frivolous and
denied without recorded dissent. The instant 2 petitions
for certiorari thus bring Antonelli's total number of frivo-
lous filings to 57.
We enter the order barring prospective filings for the
reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court
of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). Antonelli's
abuse of the writ of certiorari and of the extraordinary
writs has been in noncriminal cases, and we limit our
sanction accordingly. The order therefore will not prevent
Antonelli from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions
which might be imposed on him. The order will, however,
allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the
claims of petitioners who have not abused our processes.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
For reasons previously stated, see Martin v. District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1, 4 (1992)
(STEVENS, J., dissenting), and cases cited, I respectfully
dissent.
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